

the confidence that each State is to place in international treaties. . . . In a word, it is international morality that is at stake."

The Emperor's words were heard but no meaningful action was taken. The League quietly faded from the world scene as World War II approached. It had failed in its mission. When the League's successor, the UN, was created in 1945, it was hoped that it would function far better than its predecessor. It is now 64 years later. As we look at the UN Charter's very first statement of purpose for the United Nations, that of maintaining international peace and security, we can hardly say that UN's record in that field has been a resounding success. International morality remains at risk.

The world's inability to use the UN to advance the cause of international peace and security does not mean that none of the purposes of the Charter have been served by the UN system. If we drop from Article 1 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter, which refers to the maintenance of international peace and security, to paragraph 3, we shall find the statement of another purpose of the UN: "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms."

While the Security Council was hamstrung by the Soviet Union's "nyet" to efforts to maintain peace, the democracies, constituting a majority of the General Assembly in the early years of the UN, went to work to implement paragraph 3. In 1946, following up on the Charter's promise that the UN would promote respect for human rights, the Assembly established the UN Human Rights Commission. Under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, the Commission promptly went to work on drafting the document which became known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration, reflecting fully the thoughts of John Locke, as expressed in 1689 in his "Two Treatises of Government" and incorporated a hundred years later into the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and into the U.S. Bill of Rights, spelled out with specificity precisely what was meant by the term "human rights." It is appropriate to note that in 1948, when the Universal Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly by the affirmative vote of 48 of its 56 members, no member voted "no." Eight members, 6 Soviet bloc states plus Saudi Arabia and South Africa abstained.

In these early years of the UN's existence, the General Assembly also created other entities whose task it was to implement the UN's commitment to humanitarian work, such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children Fund, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, all three of which have done highly useful work in their respective fields and are functioning well to this day.

The truly creative period of the UN General Assembly came to an end around 1970. It came to an end as a result of the extraordinarily clever maneuvering of the totalitarians represented at the UN and the failure of the democracies to match their clever manipulations. From the founding of the UN until the 1960s, the Soviet bloc had consistently been outvoted by the democracies at the UN. That was now to come to an end.

As it was, the diplomats representing the Soviet Union and its East European satellites at the United Nations lacked the finesse needed to succeed in a parliamentary setting in which mere bluster would not suffice to win votes. But they found a close ally who had the skills needed to build a new majority bloc in the United Nations General Assembly. It was Fidel Castro.

Castro assembled a highly competent cadre of diplomats, who took on the task of building an international network of institutions that would operate in opposition to the United States. Though he was clearly aligned with the Soviet bloc, Castro got Cuba admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in due course turned the Non-Aligned and a parallel organization, the Group of 77 (G-77), into mouthpieces for the Moscow line.

An important step on the way toward taking control of the NAM and the G-77 organizations was for Castro to link up with the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. At its September 1973, where Castro sought to line up the NAM with Moscow, he was initially challenged by Muammar Qaddafi, who wanted the Non-Aligned to remain truly non-aligned. It was at that point that Castro appears to have realized how he could best attain his goal: he broke diplomatic relations with Israel and added Israel to the United States on his and the entire Soviet bloc's enemies list.

Castro had no genuine interest in the Palestinian cause. The purpose of his move in 1973 and in Cuba's key role since that time in the anti-Israel effort at the UN was to build a strong bloc at the UN of opponents of the United States. He was aware of the fact that between 1959 and 1972, the membership of the United Nations had increased by more than 60%, from 82 to 132. 35 of the additional 50 members belonged to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which had been founded in 1969, or were newly-independent African states, or both. What Castro was well aware of was that by breaking ties with Israel, he would be able to get Qaddafi's help in lining up the votes of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. But there was still the question of how to reach out to those African states that did not belong to the OIC.

It did not take the Castro and Qaddafi alliance very long to find an answer to that question. Only weeks after the September 1973 NAM summit, the General Assembly considered a resolution that called for more pressure on South Africa to end the apartheid regime. The clique that had begun to manipulate the UN chose Burundi to offer an amendment which referred to "the unholy alliance between Portuguese colonialism, South African racism, Zionism and Israeli imperialism." The amendment was adopted by a two-to-one majority. By linking Zionism with South African racism, many of the non-Muslim states of Africa were brought into the new alliance. This was the first shot in the drumfire that has continued at the UN to this very day.

The government of Burundi of those days brought truly unique qualifications to the discussion of racism. In the preceding year, the army of Burundi, led by Tutsis, had killed about 100,000 Hutus, for no reason other than their ethnicity. I should add that Burundi is a vastly different country today. In recent years its voting record on Israel-related issues at the UN has been one of the better records. Still, the Burundi initiative of 1973, undoubtedly initiated by the anti-democratic clique, was the first effort to use the issue of Israel to bring sub-Saharan African states into the anti-democratic bloc at the UN.

In the memoir of his year at the UN, entitled *A Dangerous Place* Pat Moynihan quotes from a letter that he had received from Leon Gordenker, a professor of international relations at Princeton and an expert on the United Nations, who had called Moynihan's attention to the Burundi initiative in the fall of 1973. In 1975 Gordenker wrote Moynihan to complain about the failure of the United States to engage in a concerted effort at the UN to win votes: "Surely

a government that can negotiate with China and the Soviet Union can organize enough persuasiveness to reduce the production of pernicious symbolism and to win the support from sensible regimes for human rights."

In his memoir Moynihan explains the reason for this failure: "American diplomacy put overwhelming emphasis on seeking friendly relations with individual other countries. The institutional arrangement for this was the ambassador and his embassy. To get an embassy was the great goal of the career officer; having achieved it, his final object was to be judged a successful ambassador by maintaining friendly relations. Anything that interfered with this goal was resisted by the system. In recent years, and notably in the new nations, the one aspect of foreign policy that could most interfere with this object was the voting behavior of so many of the small or new nations in multilateral forums, behavior hostile to the United States. In consequence the 'bilateral system' resisted, and usually with success, the effort to introduce multilateral considerations into its calculations."

These words, let us note, were written in 1975. It is now 34 years later. They are as relevant today as they were then. Our mission to the UN lacks the needed back-up in the capitals of UN member states.

That back-up is needed because of the vastly different manner in which our mission operates when compared to our principal opponents. Once a Cuban diplomat is assigned to the UN he stays there and, over the years, truly learns the business of multilateral diplomacy. As he continues in the UN system, he watches his counterparts from other countries arrive, begin to learn the routine, and then depart as their tour of duty at the UN comes to an end, and they are replaced by a new set of diplomats who have to learn the UN routine from scratch.

There is another aspect to the Cuban performance. While there are missions to the UN that operate under specific instructions from their respective governments, there are many other missions that receive no specific instructions, allowing their representatives at the UN to make their own decisions on how to vote. It is that aspect of the UN system that has been fully utilized in building the anti-democratic bloc. For one, arrangements are made for missions to be rewarded for their cooperation by being elected to positions in the UN system that are of special interest to them. For another, an informal job placement service operates at the UN that enables relatives of cooperating diplomats to obtain jobs in the UN Secretariat. As one diplomat once put it to me: "After you have been at the UN for a little while, you start playing the UN game and you forget about your country."

There is more to it than that. I recall an incident from the time in which I represented the United States in the UN Human Rights Commission. Having done the needed parliamentary work, I had gotten a resolution adopted that the Cubans had opposed. Immediately following the vote, the Cuban representative rose to accuse me of having bribed some of the representatives so that they would vote with the United States. After the meeting had adjourned, I asked colleagues from other missions whether that really happens at the UN. They all thought I was terribly naive. "Of course it happens," they said. "The Cubans do it all the time. So do the Libyans."

I am sure you agree that we should not pay bribes to ambassadors. But I have not found it easy to understand why we were under specific instructions at the UN never to suggest any relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and UN voting. I recognize that we should understand why Egypt or Pakistan